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In contrast with many centralised schemes P2P
systems are flexible, scalable and highly dynamic. They
offer an attractive distributed platform despite
concerns over security. This work is motivated by the
need to address explicitly the main issues that arise in
the deployment of P2P systems in a business
environment. A systematic approach is proposed in the
development of a secure and trusted system to support
authentication, non-repudiation and trust in business
transactions. This involves two stages. Firstly, the
identification of the functional components designed to
facilitate security through authentication and non-
repudiation, and those aimed at insuring trust;
secondly, their implementation and integration into a
hybrid P2P architecture, where the entry point server
plays a central role. This integration is facilitated by
the layering of functional components. Secure and
trusted file transactions are further enhanced by a
community management layer.
1. Introduction
The popularity of P2P systems is due largely to their
scalability, their adaptation and the absence of a single
point of failure [1]. They are decentralized, and owe
their resilience to the symmetric and autonomous role
that each peer is expected to play. The lack of a central
server in P2P systems enhances their flexibility but can
be a source of vulnerability.
Despite their use in a range of applications P2P
systems are mainly associated with file-sharing
applications such as in Napster [2] and BitTorrent [3].
Although the suitability of P2P systems for business
has been highlighted [4, 5], concerns over security and
reliability have hindered their wider adoption in e-
business. Authentication, non-repudiation and trust
have presented a significant challenge in e-business;
they are particularly difficult to implement in a pure
decentralised P2P system. Authentication is used to
determine the identity of an agent, whereas contractual
obligations between agents are enforced by non-
repudiation; both are usually part of a security
mechanism and are designed to create a relatively safe
environment. Trust, on the other hand, is viewed as a
concept with many facets, and consists of three factors:
ability, benevolence and integrity [6, 7]. Ability refers
to the competence of an agent in meeting requests and
providing services. It is usually assessed by the quality
of the service or the information provided, often in
terms of accuracy and reliability. Benevolence is the
expectation that an agent is well-disposed and has the
best intentions towards other agents. Finally, integrity
is the expectation that an agent would behave
according to established ethical norms. Studies have
confirmed that that trust in business tends to encourage
greater participation by users and to foster long-term
relationships [8].
This work is motivated by the need to address
explicitly some of issues that arise in the deployment
of P2P systems in a business environment. A
systematic approach is proposed in the development of
a secure and trusted system. Public encryption and
social control mechanisms are combined in order to
support authentication, non-repudiation and trust.
Relevant functional components are identified,
implemented and integrated into a layered architecture.
Secure and trusted transactions are further enhanced by
a community management component.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 presents the technological context. Section 3
describes the layered architecture of the proposed
system and outlines the functionality of the layers.
Section 4 offers a brief discussion of relevant issues
with pointers for further work, and Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. Technological context
A consideration of the technological characteristics
of P2P systems is helpful in selecting relevant
architectures.
2.1 P2P systems
In a P2P system an intervention by a peer involves
two stages. The first stage facilitates access by
providing a mechanism for peers to locate and join a
network. New nodes need the address of an access
point, which is usually well publicised. In Napster
this task was achieved by means of centralised indices
       
         
       
          
        
             
           
          
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
       
         
      
        
        
          
           
          
           
         
         
          
         
         
          
 
     
 
           
         
         
       
       
         
         
     
      
     
 
   
 
         
        
         
          
      
       
         
          
       
        
          
         
      
        
      
             
         
       
        
        
           
    
 
     
 
         
         
       
     
       
         
          
        
   
           
      
    
[1]. This was however, considered a potential
bottleneck and a single point of failure, which was
overcome in Gnutella by the distribution of
independent lists on the Web [9]. Irrespective of the
degree of its centralisation, the entry point mechanism
has traditionally been confined to a passive role.
The second stage is concerned with looking up
services. In some systems this is mediated by a
centralised directory [1], which holds information on
all peers. In unstructured systems [9] the flooding
mechanism fulfills this role through the propagation of
queries from peer to peer, whereas in structured
systems [10] it is implemented by distributed hash
tables (DHT). Although variants of these schemes have
been proposed [11], the general consensus is that
centralised directories are incompatible with a pure
P2P approach. All these architectures are vulnerable to
malicious attacks [12]. Centralised systems and
unstructured systems, such as Gnutella, are prone to
denial of service attacks while structured systems, such
as Chord [10], can be subject to malicious routing.
The core issue that underlines the vulnerability of
P2P systems is the difficulty of ensuring the identity of
a peer. The openness of P2P systems and the relative
anonymity of the transactions that can be conducted in
a P2P envirnement can be exploited by malicious peers
and abused by free riders [13]. This concern can be
addressed by the setting up of a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) by the deployment of a trust and
reputation system [14], or by a hybrid solution.
2.2 Public key infrastructure (PKI)
A PKI promotes a centralized approach to security.
Its appeal stems from the association of public keys
with their respective identities and their guarantee by a
certificate authority. With its implied centralisation a
fully-fledged deployment of a public key infrastructure
may go against the fundamental principles of a pure
P2P system. It has however, the advantage of
facilitating authentication and of enforcing non-
repudiation through signatures. Furthermore, it can
also ensure confidentiality through encryption.
2.3 Trust management
Researchers have resorted to social control
mechanisms as a way of assessing the trustworthiness
of peers. Trust and reputation systems [15, 16] were
introduced in P2P systems in order to create a safe
environment for collaboration, to deter uncooperative
behaviour and free-riding, and to counter malicious
attacks such as content pollution and denial of service
(DOS). Trust defined as the belief that a peer is
Figure 1. Layered architecture
reliable, well-intentioned and honest, is built gradually
from the experience of direct interactions between any
two peers [17, 18]. Reputation is defined as the public
perception of the trustworthiness of a peer; it is
generated from the recommendations or references
from other peers. While trust is personalized and
subjective, reputation is a collective measure.
In trust-based systems a peer assigns a trust level to
another peer based on an assessment of its past
behaviour. Threshold values are used to discriminate
between trusted and un-trusted peers, and to influence
patterns of interaction. Trust assessment can be refined
by associating a trust level with a peer and with a
group of peers.
3. A hybrid layered architecture
As noted earlier, authentication and non-repudiation
can be difficult to enforce in a decentralized P2P
system. A hybrid architecture, which combines partial
centralisation for security enforcement, with
autonomous peer behaviour seems more appropriate. A
trust management system can also be grafted onto the
P2P network. As trust has many facets the mapping of
ability, benevolence and integrity onto a P2P system
may be problematic.
In meeting security and trust requirements a number
of functional components were identified. Network
     
     
         
        
       
      
      
         
         
          
        
         
         
        
     
 
    
 
             
          
         
       
        
        
         
      
           
           
          
        
        
           
          
        
             
           
        
        
          
       
       
 
    
 
           
        
         
           
          
        
         
         
            
          
  
          
       
         
        
         
          
         
        
         
           
       
         
     
 
 
       
management, security management, trust management,
community management and transaction management
were integrated into a layered architecture. This type
of architecture offers a number of benefits. Functional
components can be developed independently with the
added advantage of reuse. Layering facilitates
enhancement, configurability and adaptivity [19]. The
proposed architecture is presented in Figure 1 with a
brief outline of the most important functions of each
layer. In the hierarchy of layers, the lowest is the
network and the highest is the transaction management
layer. The significant feature of this P2P architecture is
its hybrid mode of operation. The P2P entry point
mechanism acts as a certificate authority and therefore
introduces some partial centralisation.
3.1 Network management
Flexibility in mode of operation was one of the key
factors in the design of the system. This was facilitated
by a combination of hybrid solutions employed in the
network layer. An unstructured network, similar to
Gnutella, was implemented with flooding as a vehicle
for query propagation, controlled by a decrement hop
count. This type of network is suitable for highly
dynamic and heterogeneous environments. When a
peer receives a query it first returns its own result and
then, if the number of hops remaining for that query is
greater than one, it decrements the number of hops and
forwards the query to its neighbours. Peers keep up-to­
date information on other peers by sending ‘periodic
keep alive’ messages. If a peer fails to reply to three
successive ping attempts it is assumed dead, or at least
uncooperative, and is removed from the neighbour set.
Access to the P2P network is via an entry point
server (EPS). The first contact of a peer with the entry
point server is initiated explicitly by a potential
newcomer. A successful admission to the network is
rewarded by the provision of a list of neighbour peers,
which will be subsequently contacted directly without
any further mediation by the server.
3.2 Security management
The security layer is concerned mainly with the
authentication of the peers and the secure transmission
of messages. In the creation of a secure environment
the entry point server acts as the trusted third party. Its
role as a certificate authority (CA) is to validate the
association of identity with public key, without any
bearing on the trustworthiness of the peer holding that
certificate [18]. Peers who wish to verify certificates
need to have access to the public keys of at least some
of the high level CAs, who are assumed to be
trustworthy [16].
The asymmetric encryption scheme is also exploited
in securing communication paths. For efficiency
reasons both public and private keys are combined in
the hybrid encryption of messages. Data is encrypted
using a secret key, which is then encrypted and
encapsulated in a message using the public key of the
recipient. The recipient can then decrypt the data by
using the encapsulated secret key, which is decrypted
with its private key. Although the main drawback of
the use of a PKI is the implicit centralisation that it
promotes its deployment mitigates the effect of
impersonation by malicious peers. It has also the
advantage of supporting non-repudiation through
signatures.
Figure 2. Peer authentication and interaction
  
 
           
         
        
          
         
          
       
         
         
         
        
          
         
          
         
         
         
         
         
         
          
         
      
 
   
 
           
       
         
          
         
            
         
           
         
          
         
          
        
           
        
        
         
          
          
           
          
          
         
          
          
          
       
         
   
 
   
 
               
           
             
          
         
           
          
         
         
     
 
  	 	 	 	 	     
 







    
           
          
         
          
           
          
       
          
         
          
          
         





             
         
        
         
      
        
          
        
         
Peer initiation
The dynamics of the P2P system initiation is
illustrated in Figure 2. It demonstrates the functional
interactions that straddle the network and the security
layers. A P2P system consists of an entry point server,
which also acts as a certificate authority for the
network and of a set of peers as client applications.
Communication with the server requires the server’s
digital certificate, which is publicly available. A peer
contacts the server to request a digital certificate which
represents the identity supplied by another peer. If the
identity has not been previously presented the server
generates a certificate, signs it and returns it to the
client peer; otherwise the server notifies it that the
identity is not available. Once the peer obtains a valid
digital certificate it requests a list of neighbours from
the server, which then returns a random selection of
online peers. The requesting peer informs them that it
is aware of their existence and forwards its digital
certificates. If the peers agree to communicate with it
they return their own digital certificate. Once a peer
has populated its set of neighbours it no longer needs
to contact the server. All other communication in the
system takes place directly between peers.
3.3 Trust management
Trust management is relatively complex because it is
context sensitive, multi-faceted and dynamic [17]. The
level of trust of the P2P network involves two
components: the reliability of a peer and the quality of
service provided by the peer. The reliability is assessed
in terms of the ability of a peer to respond to requests.
The reliability of peers may be affected by machine
status or network latency, a state of affairs that is often
outside the control of peers. The trust rating assigned
to a peer should reflect past interactions and take into
account the experience of other peers in the system.
Besides the intrusive and inefficient nature of
recommendations, a reliance on reputation only may be
detrimental to new peers; this is often referred to as the
‘cold start problem’. The exclusion of newcomers to
the system is prevented by assigning an initial
threshold trust value that enables them to interact with
other peers. The quality of service is determined by the
rating assigned by the user to the files received. This
covers a range of possibilities from a harmful file to a
file of excellent quality. The quality of service of a
peer is the cumulative total of the service quality for
each transaction. Although the quality of service is the
most critical factor in determining a level of trust, it
may be affected by the reliability of a peer. The
calculation of trust relates more to the way trust is
established between people, and identifies a continuous
range of values rather than a mere binary evaluation
[18, 20].
Local trust
Trust (T) is a function of the reliability (R) of a peer
and of the quality of service (S) for the transactions of
that peer, T = f (R, S). The reliability of a peer is
calculated as the average of the reliability ratings of all
the transactions with that peer. The reliability factor is
used to scale the quality of the files as determined by
the user. This factor is designed to give a better
indication of the quality of the context of interaction
and provide a more realistic assessment of the trust.
Trust T is computed as
T = (if(T > 0)tℎen R else 0 ) × S , where
Number of Transactions-lReliability ii=o R = (∑ ) ,NumberO[Transactions 
Number o[ File Ratings-1k=o QualityOfSermicekS = (∑ )NumberOfFileRatings 
Distributed trust
For a peer with any recorded historical behaviour
peers issue a request for distributed trust, which is an
aggregate of the local trust values returned by known
peers. It represents the reputation of a peer. A request
for reference is sent to peers who are known and who
have a local trust value greater than a user configurable
threshold value. The recipients of the request
determine their own local trust value for the peer in
question, and return it to the requesting peer. Each
returned value is scaled by the trust value of the
sending peer, as a credibility factor [10, 16, 17]. The
average of the received local trust values becomes the
distributed trust value for the unknown peer [17, 20,
21].
Trust bias
The calculation of the trust level for a peer involves
mainly an assessment of the ability component of trust.
This encompasses file quality and response time. As
this work does not deal explicitly with free-riding or
malicious behaviour, the benevolence and integrity
components are subsumed in the evaluation of the
ability factor. It is assumed therefore that a peer, who
provides files of high quality, within an acceptable
interval of time, is benevolent and has some integrity.
   
 
         
        
     
       
      
       
         
          
       
          
          
          
      
            
          
        
           
        
           
          
          
           
          
         
         
        
          
      
           
       
       
        
        
  
 
     
 
             
          
         
        
      
 
   
 
             
         
          
           
          
       
         
            
 
    
 
             
          
         
           
          
          
          
      
            
       
         
          
         
        
         
           
        
          
        
           
           
          
       
          
         
           
   
           
             
          
    Figure 3. File management
3.4 Community management
In community management peers have the
opportunity to overcome the limitations of a flat
network structure, by introducing semantically-based
structures [22]. An unmanaged scheme without a
coordinator presides over community formation. Peers
assume responsibility for discovering groups of interest
and for joining and leaving them. An explicit
declaration of interest in a particular topic by a peer
identifies implicitly a group, which eventually includes
all the peers that share this interest. This explicit
method offers a peer some discretion over its level of
commitment to a group while at the same time it
minimises storage and processing requirements.
The search for peers with the same interest involves
potentially two stages. In the first instance peers in a
neighbourhood are queried about an interest. When a
match is found the peer requests a list of peers that
belong to the corresponding group. If the neighbours
do not share the interests of the peer they forward the
request to their own neighbours. Each peer in a group
maintains an up-to-date list of the peers in that group.
Each peer has the ability to query any member of the
group and to view the resources that members of the
group are making available. A group can be selectively
targeted by a peer through directed flooding to request
information. Members of a community are more likely
to share files based on common interests, and to hold
each other in high esteem.
The existence of communities often leads to better
organisation of information and its dissemination [22,
23]. While the transactions conducted within a
community are still constrained by security and trust
requirements, they are also subjected to an implicit
‘community trust’.
3.5 Transaction management
File management is taken as an example of business
transactions and as an illustration of the access to and
exchange of resources. The mediation of file sharing is
assumed by the transaction management layer and is
supported by the lower layers.
File management
A user can decide which files are shared by placing
them in a special folder, which may contain subfolders;
they hold files specific to a particular interest group.
All shared files are held in a tree structure of folders,
where the user can view and edit file properties. The
customisation process is further refined by granting
users some control over file sharing; ten levels of
access to files can be set for the other peers (Figure 3).
File Search
The search for files can be performed either by file
name or by metadata, to allow for more useful results
to be returned. One incentive for peers to provide
metadata for the files they are sharing is that they are
more likely to receive a higher trust rating if they
provide useful files to peers. This in turn will grant
them access to a greater range of resources held and
shared by the other peers.
Anonymous file transfer is also supported in the P2P
system. When files are requested anonymously, the
message is forwarded from peer to peer through the
network until it reaches the host. On receipt of the
message, the host responds to the requesting peer with
a download ticket. This peer then sends another
download ticket to the peer it received the request
from, and so on through the chain until the peer who
originally requested the file receives a download ticket
and starts to download the file. The file is relayed
through all peers involved in the query propagation
chain. Each peer knows only the peer it is receiving the
file from and the peer it is relaying the file to.
Anonymity requires a trade off in security as any file
transferred in this way, although encrypted between
peers, will be visible to those peers. A user must
explicitly allow a file to be accessed anonymously, as
trust can no longer be relied upon to protect that file
from untrustworthy peers.
The retrieval of file duplicates by clients is pre­
empted by the return of an MD5 hash of a file with its
content. This hash acts as a file handle that uniquely
        
         
            
          
           




           
        
          
         
          
         
         
          
          
         
          
          
           
         
        





         
        
       
        
       
         
         
       
        
          
          
    
         
      
     
      
      
  
          
          
        
       
     
      
      
          
          
          
          
       
        
        
     
      
         
         
     
          
      
      
       
       
       
    
          
      
      
 
    
identifies each file. When query results are received
and collated only the first response for each unique
MD5 hash is added to the list of results. It is assumed
that the result received first is most likely to originate
from a peer who may be physically closer or has more
system resources available.
Client interface
A graphical user interface enables client peers to
initiate and control their interactions with other peers
(Figure 4). The design of the interface reflects to a
large extent the hierarchy of layers of the P2P
architecture. At the top of the window the network
layer is indicated by the identity and the connection
status. The behaviour of the security layer is outside
the control of the user and is therefore transparent. The
trust layer manifests itself in the setting of a threshold
minimum value and in the display of distributed trust
ratings for a particular peer. In the group management
layer provision is made for peers to join and leave
groups, and to view the resources shared by peers in a
group. The most important part of the window is
Figure 4. Transaction management
devoted to the transaction management layer where a
high level of customisation can be set in the search for
files.
4.	 Discussion
The proposed hybrid architecture offers adequate
mechanisms for ensuring security and trust. There are
however, a number of issues for consideration:
•	 In meeting some of the fundamental requirements
in e-business, the proposed P2P architecture has
deviated from the pure P2P model. It has
conferred to the entry point server (EPS) a central
role in the PKI. This partial centralisation
underlines the potential vulnerability of the EPS as
a bottleneck and as a single point of failure. This
can be alleviated by the provision of a number of
entry point servers.
•	 The design and implementation of the system has
benefited from the layering approach. The
different functional components were integrated
seamlessly. Trust management was enhanced by
the incremental functionality of the different
layers.
•	 The focus of trust management has been on the
determination of the ability of a peer. A more
comprehensive mapping of trust should also give a
greater weight to integrity by identifying and
sanctioning explicitly, for example, malicious
behaviour. Trust evaluation is however enhanced
by community management. A tighter community
is bound to lead to a higher level of trust.
•	 In its management of trust the system conforms to
the ‘pull model’ where a peer sends its local trust
value to another peer on request. A peer does not
propagate its adjustments to trust levels following
a ‘bad’ or’ good’ experience with other peers.
Propagation on a wider scale might obscure trust
assessment and increase communication and
processing overheads. The propagation of a re­
evaluation of trust may be more relevant within a
community where a high level of integrity can be
assumed and maintained.
•	 File sharing was used as a demonstration of the
functionality of the transaction management layer.
Despite its limitations, this application has
managed to illustrate the interaction and behaviour
of the different layers. A more business-based
application would have shed more light on
features such as non-repudiation.
•	 The P2P approach offers a viable alternative to the
increasing centralisation and control of many
initiatives such as Cloud computing.
  
 
           
       
       
       
       
      
         
          
       
      
          
        
         





          
     
      
        
   
    
      
        
          
        
      
         
     
        
       
         
       
 
          
         
       
      
       
   
         
     
     
      
       
   
 
          
      
      
      
      
 
          
       
     
       
       
      
     
       
         
      
   
          
       
       
     
     
          
     
         
      
        
  
          
      
 
 
     
    
          
       
  
           
          
       
      
       
          
        
       
     
        
     
     
     
      
           
     
      
        
 
            
       
       
     
 
5.	 Conclusion
A layered P2P architecture was presented as a
platform for the conduct of some e-business
transactions. In meeting security and trust requirements
partial centralisation was introduced into a hybrid
system, by deploying a public key infrastructure.
Authentication and non-repudiation were supported by
the deployment of a PKI, whereas trust was established
mainly by the determination of the level of the ability
of peers. The community management layer provides
further refinement in trusted transactions.
Although, the architecture forms an adequate basis
for a safe environment, its functionality can be
extended by taking into account the integrity of peers,
and by introducing spatial parallelism to enhance its
resilience.
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